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Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an AtWill World
Rachel Arnow-Richman
abstract. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, companies have taken swi� and severe
disciplinary action against alleged harassers, raising questions in some instances as to whether
their responses were justiﬁed. This Essay argues that balancing the goals of the #MeToo movement with principles of fairness to the accused demands attention to an overlooked aspect of the
problem: the employment status of the alleged harasser. The background rule of employment at
will, coupled with employer contracting practices and the law of sexual harassment itself, produces
a world in which employers are inclined to tolerate sexual harassment and other misconduct by
top-level employees, but aggressively police “inappropriate” behavior by the rank-and-ﬁle. This
Essay concludes that changing this calculus will require abandoning long-standing contracting
practices that protect top-level employees and adopting collective bargaining-style protocols for
dealing with vulnerable workers accused of harassment.
introduction
In November 2017, in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein scandal, Minnesota
Public Radio (MPR) announced that it was severing ties with radio personality
Garrison Keillor based on “allegations of his inappropriate behavior.” 1 According to Keillor, he inadvertently placed a hand on an employee’s bare back while

1.
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Angie Andresen, Statement from Minnesota Public Radio Regarding Garrison Keillor and a Prairie
Home Companion, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.mpr.org/stories/2017
/11/29/statement-from-minnesota-public-radio-regarding-garrison-keillor-and-a-prairie
-home-compa [https://perma.cc/76AH-UYCB].
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trying to console her. 2 Public indignation at the ﬁring followed. Within days,
MPR had received thousands of comments from the entertainer’s fan base objecting to its decision. 3 MPR, according to listeners, had come down too hard
for too little.
As with so many of the stories born of the #MeToo movement, however,
more was to come. Subsequent press coverage revealed an eleven-year history of
questionable behavior, including sexual remarks, alleged age and gender discrimination, and an oﬀer of a conﬁdential settlement following a soured relationship with a subordinate. 4 Such revelations, like the even more egregious examples exposed over the six months that followed, land a one-two punch: as
shocking as the behavior is the fact that it was tolerated for so long.
It is too soon to predict the legacy of the #MeToo movement, but the story
of Keillor’s fall suggests two very diﬀerent possibilities. It conﬁrms what appears
to be the dominant response: public opinion has overwhelmingly supported victims and condemned perpetrators. Onlookers are by now familiar with the recurring media cycle in which a single accusation of “sexual misconduct” against
a well-known ﬁgure spurs initial denial and outrage, only to be followed by a
larger media reveal.
But there is also an undercurrent of concern. Some commentators have questioned whether accused harassers are receiving “due process” and expressed fear
that trivial or benign sexualized behavior will get swept up in the mix. 5 Employers may feel they have little choice in handling employee complaints. With harassment in the spotlight, many are likely to conclude that a swi� and severe response to any allegation of misconduct is the only way to avoid a public relations
nightmare. 6

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
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Laura Yuen et al., Investigation: For Some Who Lived in It, Keillor’s World Wasn’t Funny, MPR
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/01/23/keillor
-workplace [https://perma.cc/QY7K-UK77].
Garrison Keillor, Garrison’s Response to Jon McTaggrt’s Letter of Jan. 23, 2018, GARRISON KEILLOR (Feb. 4, 2018), http://www.garrisonkeillor.com/writing [https://perma.cc/5PKDKWVM]; Yuen et al., supra note 2.
Yuen et al., supra note 2.
Valeriya Safronova, Catherine Deneuve and Others Denounce the #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/movies/catherine-deneuve-and
-others-denounce-the-metoo-movement.html [https://perma.cc/WP4F-PCF2]; Shira A.
Scheindlin & Joel Cohen, A�er #MeToo, We Can’t Decide to Ditch Due Process, GUARDIAN (Jan.
8, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/metoo-due
-process-televictions [https://perma.cc/WB7M-DHMR].
Elizabeth Chuck, Accusations in the #MeToo Era: How Companies Handle Complaints, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2017, 8:27 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct
/accusations-metoo-era-how-companies-handle-complaints-n829326
[https://perma.cc
/MP8A-CTV8].
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This Essay argues that balancing the goals of the #MeToo movement with
principles of fairness demands attention to an overlooked aspect of the problem:
the employment status of the accused. The background rule of employment at
will, coupled with employer-contracting practices and the law of sexual harassment itself, produces a world in which employers are inclined to tolerate sexual
harassment and other misconduct by top-level employees but aggressively police
“inappropriate” behavior by the rank-and-ﬁle. While the former have the market
power to negotiate job security and other contractual protections, the latter are
almost invariably at-will employees who have no legal recourse against job loss
or disproportionate discipline. Faced not only with the risk of sexual-harassment
liability, but now with potential damage to their image and brand, companies
have little to lose in taking a hard line against the most vulnerable workers.
In sum, both #MeToo reformers and the movement’s skeptics are correct:
when it comes to accusations of sexual harassment, we need greater institutional
accountability for the conduct of those at the top of the workplace hierarchy,
alongside greater protection for the rank-and-ﬁle. This Essay considers why that
is and how it might be achieved.
Part I explains how the dominant account of sexual harassment ignores the
roles of gender and power—oversights that pave the way for a misdirected corporate response that indiscriminately targets sexualized behavior rather than
sex-based harassment. Part II uncovers how background law and private ordering by employers enable recurring sexual harassment by high-level actors but
leave ordinary workers vulnerable to disproportionate discipline. Part III oﬀers
preliminary suggestions for an appropriate organizational approach to handling
accusations of harassment. Companies must put a ﬁrm stop to exploitive sexbased behavior while taking a nuanced approach to sexualized behavior generally. This requires abandoning long-standing contracting practices that protect
top-level employees and adopting collective-bargaining-style protocols for dealing with vulnerable workers accused of harassment.
i. sexual harassment as an extension of employer power
Determining how to appropriately handle accusations of sexual harassment
requires an understanding of the underlying wrong. The #MeToo movement,
like the discussion of sexual harassment historically, has focused almost exclusively on unwanted sexualized behavior. 7 This both misunderstands the harm of
sexual harassment and overlooks its context. Sexual harassment is an expression
of gender discrimination enabled by workplace power dynamics—dynamics that
7.

Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 33-34 (2018)
[hereina�er Schultz, Reconceptualizing Again].
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derive in part from the absence of legal protection for vulnerable workers. The
top dogs of the work world are uniquely positioned to perpetrate harassment,
while the workers below them face the risk of ill-founded accusations of harassment and are defenseless against any employer response.
In her seminal work, Professor Vicki Schultz argues that sexual harassment
has become unmoored from gender-equality principles. 8 She reminds us that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination: its purpose and eﬀect is to call
attention to women’s diﬀerences, implicitly undermining their capacity as workers while asserting and preserving male privilege and status. 9 Sexual harassment
may express itself in sexualized language or behavior or it may take the form of
nonsexualized hostility toward workers of either sex who fail to conform to prescribed gender norms. 10 This makes sexual desire a poor proxy for the problem.
Eﬀorts to eliminate workplace sexuality are underinclusive because they fail to
capture nonsexualized forms of sexual harassment. 11 They are also likely to be
overinclusive in that they fail to distinguish between discriminatory and innocuous—sometimes, even welcome—sexualized behavior. 12
Schultz’s classic account of what is wrong with standard sexual harassment
discourse is correct. But, as she acknowledges in her contribution to this Collection, it is also incomplete. 13 The popular conception of sexual harassment not
only ignores discrimination as a central element of sexual harassment, it also disregards the inherent power dynamics of the typical employment environment.
To be sure, the composition and structure of many workplaces reﬂect longstanding discrimination—as the #MeToo movement lays bare, the highest
ranked positions in many industries are held by men who assert power in discriminatory ways, whether through sexualized or other forms of harassment,
against women in subordinate positions. 14 But the ability to mistreat workers of

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
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See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) [hereina�er
Schultz, Reconceptualizing]; Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003)
[hereina�er Schultz, Sanitized Workplace].
Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1699-1702; Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note
8, at 2079-87.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1756-61, 1774-89; Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2065-66. For an excellent account of how gender norm conformity undergirds
sexual harassment, see Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 7376(2018) (using narrative and queer theory to juxtapose desire-based and gender-based harassment in the context of sexual harassment of a lesbian ﬁreﬁghter).
Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1729-33.
Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2082-87.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Again, supra note 7, at 52-53.
Id.
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either sex by any means is a consequence of the general allocation of workplace
rights—an allocation that derives from employment at will.
American law presumes that both the employer and the employee are free to
terminate their relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all. 15 This
default rule, combined with the absence of robust public regulation of workplace
relationships, means that terms of employment are determined almost entirely
by private ordering. 16 Consequently, most workers, other than those at the very
top of the workplace hierarchy, have no right to their job, nor any voice in dictating the conditions of their employment. 17 They are vulnerable not only to
harassment, but also to loss of work, demotions, relocations, transfers, pay cuts,
reductions in hours, mandatory overtime, oppressive schedules—the full range
of adverse changes to their working lives and job conditions. 18 In contrast, toplevel employees are able to exert superior market power to obtain job security as
well as binding and desirable employment terms. The resulting power disparity
means that the highest-level workers are free to impose outrageous demands on
subordinate employees, subject them to verbal abuse, threaten their livelihoods,
disrupt their career trajectories—in short, to create a hostile work environment.
Antidiscrimination law, in theory, constrains private ordering by oﬀering
victims a cause of action for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. However, the prospect of a lawsuit historically has not been enough to alter

15.

For a discussion of employment at will, its scope, and its history, see Rachel Arnow-Richman,
Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1530-45 (2014); Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of Atwill Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN.
L. REV. 453, 460-66 (2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976).
16. For a general discussion of the concept of private ordering and its various forms, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324-29 (2002) (describing a rulemaking spectrum with soveriegn control at one end and unregulated private action at the
other).
17. Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 360
(2017) (noting that “both exit and voice are costly and constrained for workers,” resulting in
employers maintaining signiﬁcant power over employees).
18. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES 37-41 (2017) (analogizing the at-will workplace to a communist dictatorship); Nantiya
Ruan, Corporate Masters & Low-Wage Servants: The Social Control of Workers in Poverty, 24
WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 103, 136-47 (2017) (describing the precariousness of
low-wage work and employees’ vulnerability to objectionable working conditions). Employers can leverage all of these pressure points not only in perpetrating harassment, but also in
retaliating against those who complain. See Nicole Porter, The Perils of Reporting Harassment,
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018) (citing “discipline, negative evaluations, department
or shi� changes, demotion [and] increased surveillance” as instruments of retaliation).
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the pre-existing dynamics that have le� high-level harassment underreported
and the laws against it underenforced. 19 The #MeToo movement appears to
have tipped the balance, but thus far only in a subset of cases involving exclusively sexualized behavior. Employers who respond to the #MeToo movement
by looking solely at unwanted sexualized behavior are likely to miss the forest
while uprooting particular trees. By contrast, examining the allocation of power
in contemporary workplaces helps identify where and in what form sexual harassment is likely to occur. 20 Not only are top-level employees uniquely situated
to sexually harass their subordinates, their disproportionate inﬂuence and control makes any form of harassment, or any implicit threat of adverse consequences, more menacing.
Reports from judicial clerks of former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski
epitomize this dynamic. Absent context, the judge’s alleged conduct—the occasional sexualized comment, display of pornography, or oﬀ-color joke over a period of thirty years—while inappropriate, would not likely be deemed severe or
pervasive conduct actionable under antidiscrimination law. 21 But the alleged
events occurred in a relationship of the most extreme power imbalance, one in
19.

See Estlund, supra note 17, at 351 (“Although retaliation against employees who assert their
rights at work is usually unlawful, the law is far from swi� or sure in its response.”); Porter,
supra note 18, at 50 (“[R]eporting harassment is fraught with risk, and o�en brings very little
reward.”).
20. To be clear, this is not a causal argument. My claim is not that workplace power allocations
are determinative of sexual harassment, but rather that attention to the inherent dynamics of
at-will relationships reveals more subtle forms of sexual harassment, including non-sexualized harassment and sexualized behavior that might not otherwise be perceived as severe or
pervasive. For a nuanced examination of the role of power and other causal factors in producing harassment, including a review of the sociological literature, see Joanna L. Grossman, The
Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 35-37 (2003).
21. See Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1
763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/5CCT-7G94]. To be actionable, discriminatory harassment must be severe or pervasive. See generally Harris v. Forkli� Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (clarifying the standard for actionable sexual harassment
under Title VII); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (recognizing sexual
harassment as actionable sex discrimination where suﬃciently extreme to aﬀect terms and
conditions of employment). Courts generally do not deem verbal statements severe, and the
isolated nature of the judge’s statements, which occurred from time to time over a period of
years and were directed toward diﬀerent clerks, would make it diﬃcult for any one plaintiﬀ
to establish pervasiveness. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 32-40 (2017) (critiquing these and related
judicial interpretations of the sexual harassment standard for barring recovery to a disproportionate number of victims).

90
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which recent entrees to the legal profession work in isolation for a revered judge
with a lifetime appointment to one of the most respected federal appeals courts
in the country. They also unfolded in an environment where power was allegedly
exploited in other nonsexualized ways—the judge calling his clerks “slaves,” insisting on their absolute loyalty, and asserting total control over their lives and
schedules. 22 Such context colors the allegations to chilling eﬀect and clariﬁes the
appropriate inquiry. The question should not be whether the individual sexualized references were pervasive in and of themselves, but whether the entire climate created by the judge’s behavior constituted a hostile environment for female clerks based on their sex. 23
This description of workplace power dynamics may justify an aggressive response to allegations of sexual harassment against the type of high-level employees who have come under the #MeToo spotlight. But the power dynamics play
out diﬀerently in cases of harassment allegations leveled against lower-status
employees. Isolated sexualized comments or actions by these workers, particularly those lacking supervisory authority, are comparatively less likely to create a
toxic work environment because they are not accompanied by an implicit threat
to impose work-related consequences on the victim. For the same reason, such
rank-and-ﬁle workers are also less capable of leveraging workplace power dynamics to perpetrate nonsexualized gender-based harassment. 24
Most critically, these workers share with their accusers a vulnerability to indiscriminate adverse action by those above them in the workplace hierarchy. The
very dynamics that make workers susceptible to sexual harassment in the ﬁrst
place put them at risk of excessive disciplinary action in the face of sexual harassment allegations. Employers’ absolute power, combined with their conﬂation
of sex and sexual harassment, mean that in the #MeToo-inspired race to root

22.

Editorial, #MeToo Makes Its Way to the Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/metoo-makes-it-way-to-the-judiciary/2017/12/23/488946d4
-e5d5-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html [https://perma.cc/4XF5-6D2L].
23. To be sure, one might worry about the ability of those in power to engage in such behavior
vis-à-vis all workers, but such “equal opportunity harassment” is not proscribed by antidiscrimination law; indeed, it is protected by employment at will. For a discussion of the problem
of generalized, non-discriminatory workplace bullying, the law’s limitations in redressing it,
and possible legislative solutions, see David Yamada, Cra�ing a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 475 (2004).
24. That is not to say that supervisors are the only employees capable of creating a hostile work
environment. Indeed, some studies suggest that co-worker harassment is more common than
supervisory harassment. See Grossman, supra note 20, at 35-36 (reviewing the literature on
this point). The point is that the victim’s experience of sexualized behavior as hostile will be
inﬂuenced by the status of the perpetrator. For an example of egregious sexual harassment
perpetrated by male subordinates against their female supervisor, see Soucek, supra note 10,
at 70-73.
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out inappropriate sexualized behavior, workers with less power, engaged in less
pernicious behavior, are likely to be swept up in the rush to judgment.
ii. law, private ordering, and the construction of
workplace power
The above account of the baseline power allocations in the workplace illustrates the harm of harassment and its relationship to workplace hierarchy. But
there is more to the story. Private ordering by employers, in response to the law
and in furtherance of their business interests, exacerbates these pre-existing imbalances. Their choices directly aﬀect whether an accused harasser is likely to
receive fair treatment.
A. Contractual Protection for the Top Dogs
Top-level employees enjoy terms of employment far more favorable than
those aﬀorded to everyone else. In addition to generous compensation and beneﬁts, these individuals o�en negotiate job-security rights that constrain employers’ ability to terminate or discipline them even in situations involving alleged
sexual harassment.
The terms of chief executive contracts provide a striking example. A 2006
study examining the contracts of 375 CEOs revealed that the overwhelming majority of agreements protect against arbitrary termination, either in the form of
a guaranteed term of employment (“ﬁxed-term” contracts), the right to lucrative
payouts in the event of termination without cause, or a combination of the two. 25
Most importantly, these agreements signiﬁcantly limit employers’ ability to act
for “cause” by providing narrow, exclusive deﬁnitions of the term. Legitimate
grounds for terminating executives are commonly restricted to instances of willful misconduct, moral turpitude, or failure to perform duties, 26 categories understood to permit termination only in extreme situations. 27 Egregious harassment could fall within some of these categories, but lesser misconduct, like that
25.

Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts:
What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 247 (2006).
26. Id. at 233. Even in situations where a ﬁxed-term contract does not expressly enumerate
grounds, courts generally apply a narrower deﬁnition of just cause than that applied to indefinite agreements, requiring employers to show a material breach by the employee as opposed
to any business justiﬁcation. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW.
INST. 2015).
27. Executive employee exit is almost always a negotiated aﬀair, resulting in a dearth of relevant
caselaw. Those decisions that exist oﬀer minimal protection and few answers to employers
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alleged against Judge Kozinski, likely would not. Only two contracts in the research sample explicitly permitted termination for sexual harassment. 28 In short,
adverse employer action taken in response to allegations of sexual harassment
could, in many cases, subject companies to contractual liability.
The risk of liability is heightened by the employee-friendly standards of
proof that o�en apply to written-contract disputes. In cases involving employees
who lack power to obtain an individualized written contract, but who nonetheless can establish implied rights to long-term employment, the burden is on the
employee to show that the employer’s rationale was inadequate or pretextual. 29
Courts give employers wide latitude in justifying termination decisions. It is often enough that the decision-maker reasonably and in good faith believed it had
cause to remove the employee, even if in retrospect its decision proves incorrect. 30 In contrast, where an employee is protected by a ﬁxed-term contract, the
employer must be able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the underlying misconduct occurred. 31 In other words, if employers wish to
cleanly remove high-level employees based on sexual harassment, they better be
right about what happened.
Employers must also attend to all procedural requirements set forth in the
parties’ agreement. Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc., a recent case involving a breach
of contract action by a former executive, oﬀers a cautionary tale about the risks
of improvident termination. 32 The plaintiﬀ, Balles, began an aﬀair with an intern under his supervision, which, while apparently consensual, violated numerous company policies. 33 Owing to his inﬂuence, the company hired her, and over

28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.

navigating their legal rights in the face of high-level harassment. See Balles v. Babcock Power
Inc., 70 N.E.3d 905, 916 (Mass. 2016) (holding an employer liable for breach of an executive’s
stock contract despite the executive’s sexual misconduct where the company failed to provide
notice and an opportunity for the executive to cure his behavior); Prozinski v. Ne. Real Estate
Serv., 797 N.E.2d 415, 423-24 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (ruling that a question of fact existed as
to whether an executive’s pattern of harassing behavior against multiple women, combined
with ﬁnancial mismanagement, constituted material breach justifying the company’s refusal
to pay severance upon termination).
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 25.
See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,329 (1981).
See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 423 (Cal. 1998) (ﬁnding that
the jury should consider not whether Cotran actually sexually harassed other employees, but
whether, at the time of termination, the decision to terminate his employment was made in
good faith by the defendants).
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2015).
Balles, 70 N.E.3d at 907.
Id. at 909.
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the course of their relationship, Balles, while continuing to serve as her supervisor, promoted and awarded her raises, traveled with her on company-funded
trips, and sent her sexually explicit messages and photos through company devices. 34
Upon discovering the relationship, the company terminated Balles, refused
to pay him severance, and exercised an adverse provision in his stock agreement. 35 Balles sued and won, successfully arguing that his behavior did not constitute cause permitting the employer to buy back his shares in the company. 36
His stock agreement allowed the employer to exercise its rights upon
“fraud, . . . gross insubordination . . . [or] willful and material breach . . . not
corrected within thirty” days. 37 The court read the ﬁrst two grounds narrowly,
rejecting arguments that Balles’s ﬂouting of company policy and eﬀorts to cover
up his aﬀair constituted either fraud or insubordination. 38 More revealingly, it
dismissed the theory that Balles’s conduct might have constituted a material
breach, owing to the company’s failure to provide the requisite notice and opportunity to cure. 39 In so doing, it rejected the employer’s argument that Balles’s
abuse of power and the harm he had caused could not be undone. 40 In eﬀect, the
court held that the executive was contractually entitled to one free bite at the
apple. 41
Balles illustrates why employers are inclined to be cautious in responding to
allegations of harassment perpetrated by high-level employees. Not only are
these individuals “just cause” employees, their contracts typically qualify that
term to preclude termination for some behavior that would ordinarily appear to
constitute cause—including inappropriate sexual behavior. Yet the #MeToo
movement has revealed a further twist: media sources report that Harvey Weinstein’s contract not only limited permissible causes for termination to conviction
of a crime or fraud, an exceedingly narrow deﬁnition even by executive-contract
standards, but actually contemplated and permitted misconduct toward other
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Id.
Id. at 909-10.
Id. at 918. In contrast to the stock agreement, the employment agreement did not limit the
grounds for termination, and consequently the trial court’s ﬁnding that the company was not
obligated to pay Balles severance under that agreement was not appealed. Id. at 910.
Id. at 908. The agreement also permitted termination in two other cases—commission of a
felony or willful failure to perform—which the employer did not invoke in its defense.
Id. at 913-14.
Id.
Id. at 916.
The plaintiﬀ was ultimately awarded his stock less a withholding for the company’s successful
counterclaim for breach of ﬁduciary duty, a claim not dependent on any contract. Id.
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employees. If Weinstein “treated someone improperly in violation of the company’s Code of Conduct,” the contract required him to reimburse the company
for any resulting settlements or judgments and pay a graduated penalty of between $250,000 and one million dollars depending on the number of prior violations. 42 Thus, the contract not only created a safe harbor for Weinstein’s sexual
misconduct, it anticipated and condoned an ongoing pattern of misbehavior, as
long as Weinstein was willing to pay for the privilege.
One can hope that contracts like Weinstein’s are a rarity. But they demonstrate the lengths to which companies will go to reward and protect the top dogs
of their industry. It is one of the great achievements of the #MeToo movement
that the prospect of public censure is changing the calculus for employers regarding sexual harassment allegations against high-level executives. At least in
some cases, taking action against harassers has become worth the ﬁnancial and
legal risk. But those risks remain substantial. The value of the lost dividends
alone owed to the plaintiﬀ in Balles was over $900,000, far in excess of the damages cap on sexual harassment claims. 43 In such situations, employers have more
to lose in terminating the accused than in paying out on a claim for sexual harassment. Given how the deck is stacked, there is little reason to fear that employers will respond too harshly or act without evidence against high-level harassers.
B. Employment at Will and the Powerless Harasser
When the conduct of an ordinary employee is in question, however, employer incentives cut the opposite way. To be sure, lower-level employees, even
those without supervisory authority, are capable of producing a hostile work environment, but such employees lack power vis-à-vis their employer. 44 If an accused harasser is employed at will, companies have little to lose by terminating

42.

Harvey Weinstein Contract with TWC Allowed for Sexual Harassment, TMZ (Oct. 12, 2017),
http://www.tmz.com/2017/10/12/weinstein-contract-the-weinstein-company-sexual
-harassment-ﬁring-illegal [https://perma.cc/FH6U-ZVHH]. Media sources suggest that Fox
News political commentator Bill O’Reilly was similarly insulated against repercussions for
sexual harassment by a provision prohibiting termination for allegations of misconduct absent proof in court. Testimony: Bill O’Reilly Had a Contractual Provision Virtually Allowing Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik
-wemple/wp/2017/11/08/testimony-bill-oreilly-had-a-contractual-provision-virtuallyallowing-sexual-harassment/?utm_term=.241d6e03ac54 [https://perma.cc/R2MN-R86T].
43. Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc., No. MICV201004806, 2014 WL 10337843, at *6 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 2014). Title VII caps compensatory and punitive damages at $300,000 for employers with
500 employees or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (2012).
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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that individual, and every incentive to hedge against the risk of sexual harassment liability.
Weighing against accused harassers in this calculus is the law of sexual harassment itself, which places a premium on swi� and decisive employer responses. The 1998 Supreme Court decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth and Farragher v. Boca Raton provide employers with an aﬃrmative defense
to vicarious liability for hostile work environment harassment perpetrated by a
supervisor. 45 To assert this defense, the employer must show that it “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”
and that the victim failed to take advantage of opportunities to avoid or end the
harm. 46 Scholars have criticized this defense as spawning human resource trainings and superﬁcial policies that courts accept as evidence of preventive action
but that are in fact largely ineﬀective in reducing sexual harassment. 47
While most preventive action as currently implemented may be unhelpful to
victims, the corrective action element is objectionable in a diﬀerent way:
Ellerth/Farragher-inspired corrective action can be excessively harmful to the accused. Corrective action generally involves investigating and redressing any report of objectionable behavior. Terminating an accused harasser is a sureﬁre way
of satisfying this element of the defense, even if the reported behavior might
merit lesser discipline. In cases of uncertainty, as when the employer is unable to
verify whether harassing conduct occurred, it is safer for employers to err on the
side of punishing the accused. Even if the employer is mistaken, its actions are
presumptively protected by the employment-at-will rule, whereas insuﬃcient

45.

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998).
46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. In cases of coworker harassment, a negligence
standard applies with the assessment o�en turning on similar considerations. See Vance v. Ball
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013) (noting that where harassment is commited by a nonsupervisor, a plaintiﬀ can “prevail by showing [the] employer was negligent in failing to prevent harassment” and explaining that “[e]vidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints,
or eﬀectively discouraged complaints from being ﬁled would be relevant”); Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 759 (“An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have
known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”).
47. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 67-68, 70-71
(2018); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Anne Lawton, Operating
in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Aﬃrmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 197 (2004).
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responsive action in the face of credible allegations of harassment creates the risk
of statutory liability. 48
In this context, public calls for due process for accused harassers are ironic.
There is no requirement of internal due process in an at-will workplace. If employers need no reason to terminate an employee, they need not verify the truth
of the accusations underlying their decision, provide opportunities for the
worker to be heard, or vet the proportionality of their response. In fact, harassers
arguably get more due process than at-will employees who engage in any other
form of misconduct, owing to their employers’ eﬀorts to protect themselves
from victims’ lawsuits. It is only because employers investigate allegations of
harassment to avoid potential liability to the victim that those accused enjoy any
form of process at all.
This legal landscape, combined with confusion over the underlying harm of
sexual harassment, invites employers to enforce a broad, antisexual norm against
vulnerable workers. 49 My review of recent labor arbitration awards in union
grievances bears this out. Labor awards are among the only available sources of
adjudication of employer termination and discipline for employee misconduct,
including sexual misconduct. Unionized employees, unlike most rank-and-ﬁle
workers, are contractually entitled to job security and progressive discipline, a
system of gradually escalating penalties for repeated infractions. 50 Those subject
to adverse treatment may challenge their employer’s decision through a formal
grievance process culminating in arbitration, in which the burden of proof falls
to the employer to establish just cause. 51
During the ﬁve-year period from January 1, 2013 through January 1, 2018,
there were sixty-four reported labor arbitration awards involving discipline or
termination based at least in part on alleged sexual harassment, inappropriate
48.

Elizabeth Chuck, Accusations in the #MeToo Era: How Companies Handle Complaints, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/accusationsmetoo-era-how-companies-handle-complaints-n829326 [https://perma.cc/2KCZ-64ER];
Dana Wilkie, A Rush to Judgment? Are Companies and Politicians Reacting Too Quickly to Sexual
Harassment Allegations?, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.shrm
.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/employee-relations/pages/sexual.aspx [https://perma.cc
/F2CC-NPST].
49. Schultz’s work is replete with examples. See Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at
2087-90.
50. For a general explanation of the concepts of just cause and progressive discipline in the unionized workplace, including sample clauses and their prevalence, see BLOOMBERG BNA LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 228-30 (2d ed. 1995); BLOOMBERG BNA,
BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7 (14th ed. 1995).
51. BLOOMBERG BNA, FAIRWEATHER’S PRACTICE PROCEDURE LABOR ARBITRATION § 10.II, at 27375 (4th ed. 2018).
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sexual behavior, sexual language or innuendo, bodily exposure, or sexually explicit material. 52 In twenty-eight of the awards, the grievant prevailed, meaning
the grievant obtained either a reversal or reduction in the employer’s punishment. Thus, in nearly forty-ﬁve percent of awards, the arbitrator concluded that
the employer had gone too far or acted without suﬃcient justiﬁcation or process. 53
Several of these reversals exemplify the tendency of employers to engage in
overzealous disciplinary action in response to behavior that relates to or invokes
sex or sexuality, regardless of context. In one award, the grievant was a female
distribution-center employee for a national retailer who was involved in a consensual domestic partnership with another female employee. 54 Privately, the
couple argued at work about the grievant’s alleged romantic interest in another
coworker, during which the grievant made a sexual comment about the
coworker. 55 The suspicious partner subsequently confronted the coworker and
told her about the grievant’s comment. 56 The shocked coworker stated that she
was straight and asked to be le� out of the couple’s problems. 57 An HR investigation ensued, and the employer terminated both the grievant and her partner
for violating the company’s harassment policy. 58
In another example, a male grievant, a supermarket meat cutter, was terminated for mooning his male coworker. 59 The two were engaged in horseplay in
a nonpublic area of the store when the coworker dared the grievant to drop his

52.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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pants. The grievant brieﬂy obliged and the coworker, without the grievant’s permission, snapped a photo. 60 Upon the grievant’s objection, the coworker purported to delete the photo, but many months later, he showed it to another male
employee who reported it to management. According to the grievant, the coworker displayed the photo to retaliate against him for reporting the coworker
for taking excessive breaks. 61 The employer investigated and terminated both
employees. Defending its decision in the arbitration that followed, the employer
likened the conduct to two instances of unwelcome male-on-female genital exposure that had led to termination. 62
Examples like these suggest that the risk of disproportionate discipline
against rank-and-ﬁle workers is real. Neither award involved an abuse of power;
both involved actions by coworkers who were not in a supervisory relationship.
In neither case did the objectionable conduct reﬂect hostility toward or disparate
treatment of the “victim” based on sex. The employee who reported the photo
in the horseplay case stated he did not ﬁnd it oﬀensive. 63 The comment in the
warehouse case was the product of a domestic argument and was not based on
sex discrimination.
If anything, the terminations appear to have endorsed rather than penalized
opportunistic, possibly even discriminatory, behavior. The fact that the comment in the warehouse was made by a lesbian woman referencing lesbian sex
may have contributed to the straight worker’s reaction, heightening its perceived
oﬀensiveness. 64 In the horseplay case, the photo-snapping coworker turned an
inoﬀensive, if inappropriate, jest between workplace friends into a sanctionable
act of public exposure, allegedly to get even with the grievant in a petty dispute.
Most disturbing of all is that these terminations happened prior to #MeToo
in unionized workplaces where employers are accountable for their personnel
decisions. Employers enjoying the freedom of an at-will workplace, responding
to the public pressures of the movement, are likely to act even more aggressively
in disciplining sexualized conduct.

60.
61.
62.

63.

64.

Id.
Id.
Id. The just cause standard applicable in grievance proceedings requires the employer to
prove, among other things, that the grievant received “equal treatment” vis-a-vis others who
committed similar oﬀenses in the past. See BLOOMBERG BNA, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS
vii-viii (3d ed. 2006) [hereina�er SEVEN TESTS]; see also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
Id. Under Meritor, sexual harassment, to be actionable, must be “unwelcome,” or in the
Court’s subsequent articulation of the claim, it should be subjectively oﬀensive to the victim.
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Harris v. Forkli� Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
22 (1993).
See Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2158-63 (suggesting allegations of harassment are more likely to be leveled at sexual minorities and nonwhite workers).
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iii. fair terms, fair process: accountability despite
private ordering
How should employers handle sexual harassment accusations? This Essay
has suggested that the risks of disproportionate employer responses to harassment allegations cut in diﬀerent directions depending on the employment status
of the accused. A reallocation of workplace power would, of course, do much to
remedy the situation. If workers had greater job security and greater voice in
determining their working conditions, they would be less vulnerable both to
workplace harassment and to overzealous discipline following harassment allegations. It would also be more diﬃcult for employers to terminate them, marginalize them, or purchase their silence in an eﬀort to retain and protect highlevel harassers. 65
Of course, imaging a fundamental restructuring of the workplace and employment at will is beyond the scope of this Essay. Terms and duration of employment are, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, the province of
private ordering. Fortunately, the outpouring of support for the #MeToo movement and the responsive action taken thus far suggest that employers are currently amenable to self-directed change. The time is ripe for proposals. What
follows are initial suggestions for how employers might rethink their contracting
practices and disciplinary protocols to achieve more just results when dealing
with harassment allegations.
To begin, employers should keep doing what they have begun doing in light
of #MeToo: terminating or otherwise holding harassers accountable, even if it
means unseating an iconic or revered person and even if there is a ﬁnancial cost
to doing so. There is also much that employers can do proactively with respect
to their contracts with top-level employees. Employment agreements that confer
job security should deﬁne “cause to terminate” to include conduct reasonably
likely in itself, or in tandem with further comparable behavior, to violate antidiscrimination laws. 66 To be sure, top-level employees will push to limit employer
discretion and foreclose the possibility of termination for isolated or seemingly

65.

On the problem of conﬁdentiality and settlement practices in connection with #MeToo, see
Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Oﬀender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76 (2018) (arguing for a
middle-ground approach to enforceability of nondisclosure provisions in sexual harassment
settlement agreements that would respect victims’ and perpetrators’ preference for private
resolution but ensure public access to information about the dispute in the event that the perpetrator re-oﬀends).
66. This would disrupt the current incentive scheme by giving employers more ﬂexibility to terminate high-level employees for sexual harassment despite uncertainty as to whether the perpetrator’s behavior would ultimately satisfy the “severe or pervasive” standard.
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trivial misconduct, and many have the bargaining power to insist on such terms.
But a candidate’s resistance to a provision speciﬁcally invoking compliance with
antidiscrimination laws is a signal that companies should heed. In short, employers should not agree to contract terms that have the eﬀect of insulating highlevel employees from the consequences of sexual harassment or of sanctioning
repeat oﬀenses. Provisions like those allegedly contained in Harvey Weinstein’s
contract should become a thing of the past, and any that exist should be deemed
voidable in contravention of public policy. 67
Employers should also develop counterincentives to sexual harassment. Executives and high-level managers are typically rewarded based upon stock performance and other ﬁnancial benchmarks. Employers might consider rewarding
these employees on such bases as the promotion of women and minorities, efforts to equalize pay, and reductions in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ﬁlings. 68
For all other employees, who have no contract protections and no bargaining
power, employers should adopt a proportionate discipline protocol. The union
grievance process provides a template. The evaluation of whether an employer
terminated an employee for just cause for grievance purposes commonly involves a seven-part test that focuses on three basic areas: the wrongdoing of the
employee, the quality of the employer’s investigation, and the appropriateness

67.

Basic contract law provides that contract terms may be voided as a matter of public policy,
despite the assent of both parties, where the law’s interest in enforcing the terms is outweighed by the public’s interest in non-enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Job-security provisions that protect harassers are not
themselves unlawful, but to the extent they discourage employers from taking appropriate
steps to prevent or correct harassment, their enforcement runs contrary to the public interest
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context of sexual harassment settlement agreements that preclude victims from ﬁling charges
or cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See EEOC v.
Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744-45 (1st Cir. 1996) (ﬁnding that enforcement of such provisions would unduly hamper the EEOC’s ability to investigate and curtail harassment in vindication of the public interest, and that such concerns outweighed any value served by such
provisions in enabling private dispute settlement).
68. Cf. Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 146-48 (2003) (advancing a theory of
disparate treatment law that links employer liability with the adoption of institutional safeguards to counteract implicit bias and stereotyping); Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note
8, at 2174-76 (advocating for litigation advantages to employers who meet gender desegregation benchmarks).
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of the employer’s adverse action judged in the context of the particular workplace. 69 This inquiry can inform an employer’s determination of what constitutes a proportionate response in the context of alleged sexual harassment.
In the grievance context, arbitrators assess the employee’s wrongdoing in relation to the employer’s rules. 70 In the harassment context, employers should
assess wrongdoing with an informed understanding of what sexual harassment
is and why it is harmful. That is, they should ask whether the conduct was harassing to members of one sex and exploitive of workplace power dynamics. In
evaluating the investigation, labor arbitrators ask whether the process was thorough and fair and supported the employer’s conclusions. 71 This evaluation includes determining such things as whether the employer interviewed all available witnesses, engaged in appropriate follow up, provided the accused notice and
an opportunity to be heard, and reached its ultimate decision objectively and deliberatively. 72 Employers should bear in mind the same considerations when investigating harassment, mindful that the facts in dispute o�en concern the perpetrator’s underlying intent and the victim’s genuine perception rather than
whether the complained-of behavior actually occurred. Consistent with sexual
harassment law, employers should ask whether the conduct was oﬀensive to the
victim and likely to be oﬀensive to members of the victim’s sex. 73
Finally, in assessing the appropriateness of disciplinary action, arbitrators ask
whether the punishment ﬁt the crime. In sexual harassment matters, employers
should not treat oﬀensive statements, particularly isolated ones, the way they
would treat recurring or unwelcome physical conduct. In such instances, corrective action short of termination may provide a tailored and eﬀective response. In
addition to proportionality considerations, the inquiry invites self-examination
on the employer’s part. In the grievance context, arbitrators take account of mitigating circumstances, including employer practices and whether it may have
condoned or contributed to the employee’s conduct. 74 This is not to suggest that
known perpetrators should escape punishment, but rather that organizations
must be careful not to scapegoat individual actors at the expense of broader cor-

69.
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Known commonly as the “seven tests,” the questions are attributed to Arbitrator Carroll
Daugherty’s decision in Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966) (Daugherty,
Arb.). See SEVEN TESTS, supra note 62, at 27-28.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 265.
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rective action. As Schultz’s work has shown, sexual harassment ﬂourishes alongside other forms of gender inequality. 75 Employers should not ask merely
whether the employee’s conduct merited a particular response, but whether their
own conduct deserves censure. What has the employer done to advance
women’s careers, improve their working conditions, create cultures of inclusion,
and ensure equal opportunity? Such questions are far more important than ferreting out sexual conduct by low-level employees, an endeavor that can seem like
an easy solution but in reality can divert attention away from institutional responsibility. 76 Systemic changes within organizations can have broader and
more far-reaching impact in achieving gender equality than one-oﬀ punishments of low-level harassers. Employers should view the quest to end harassment not as a witch hunt, but as a process of institutional self-reﬂection.
conclusion
The #MeToo movement has exposed outrageous, even criminal, conduct by
the masters of the workplace, revealing not just a tendency to odious behavior at
the top of organizational hierarchies, but an extreme power imbalance in the
workplace. Victims’ accounts arising out of the #MeToo movement reveal a
world in which high-level decision makers wield unrestricted control over employees. Meanwhile, the organizations in which they work have looked away,
even in situations of the most egregious abuse.
Amazingly, this state of aﬀairs is changing. Women are speaking out; and
just as importantly, they are being believed. At this momentous time, it may
seem insensitive or even dangerous to ask about what happens to the accused.
But in the end, harassers’ rights are also workers’ rights. Organizational structures that allow individual decision makers free reign to mete out the harshest
forms of discipline are the same ones that enable harassers to leverage sexual
harassment as means of asserting control over dependent workers. Achieving a
calibrated organizational response to sexual harassment allegations may ultimately better serve the broader goals of the movement. Why not make the most
of #MeToo—for women and for all vulnerable workers?

75.
76.

Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8.
On the limits and dangers of employer eﬀorts to address sexual harassment through penalizing individual actors, see Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13
GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 836-37; (2005); Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 210319.
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